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1.  Introduction
A number of studies in recent years have pointed out that the character of 
political competition in the European Parliament (EP) is becoming similar to 
that in national parliaments. In particular, scholars have highlighted the growing 
importance of traditional left-right contests, and of the European cleavage, at 
the expense of the previously dominant voting along national lines (e.g., Crespy 
& Gajewska, 2010; Demker, 2014; Volacu, 2012; Bressanelli, 2013; Hobolt, 
2015).
An important precondition of fully-fledged party competition in any parliamentary 
body is the presence of an opposition and of political formations supporting the 
executive. Typically, some parties are in government and support its work in 
parliament, whereas the opposition seeks to scrutinise the government and to 
obtain executive power. Matters are not so straightforward in the political system 
of the European Union (EU), however. European elections do not lead directly 
to government formation, however the 2014 elections to the EP introduced a 
new procedure to elect the President of the European Commission (hereafter, 
Commission), the so-called Spitzenkandidaten1. The Lisbon Treaty states: 
 Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and 
after having held the appropriate consultations, the European 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European 
Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. (Article 17 
of the TEU).
Lead candidates/a candidate for President of the European Commission have 
linked the EP and the Commission more closely. One of the reasons for the 
change in the practice of appointing Spitzenkandidaten is to increase the 
legitimacy of the Commission.
One may identify political groups in the EP that find the make-up of the 
Commission congenial (not least because some of its members are of the same 
1 Our analysis concerns the pre-Lisbon Treaty period. However, the Barroso Commis-
sions claimed to be anticipations of the Spitzenkandidaten provisions in the Constitu-
tional Treaty/Lisbon Treaty. The idea of introducing a legal link between the compo-
sition of the future Parliament and nominating candidates for Commission president 
appeared to be the compromise acceptable to all parties involved in the Convention 
deliberations. According to the draft elaborated in Estoril and tabled by the European 
People’s Party, personalisation aimed to ensure greater democratic legitimacy of the 
Commission. Moreover, the idea of personalisation was elaborated in the 1990s by 
Jacques Delors (Gostyńska, 2014).
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party family) as well as others which might be described as being in opposition to 
the Commission. It means those political groups that are not directly represented 
at a political level within the Commission College. Unlike that of a national 
parliament, the opposition in the EP has to focus largely on the business of 
scrutiny. The questions then are: what instruments does the opposition in the EP 
have at its disposal for such scrutiny, how does it use them, do these instruments 
serve to conceptualise opposition in the EP and, if so, how?
This article tries to offer answers to these questions by an analysis of parliamentary 
questions in the EP. Various important actors or arenas could be identified in the 
EP: the plenary sitting, and majorities within it; the Committees; other groupings 
(intergroups, etc); the individual MEPs and especially the political groups. We 
analyse political groups because they are homogeneous political subjects that 
we know from parliamentary democracies as parliamentary factions of political 
parties. Political groups are associations of politically like-minded national 
political parties. Generally, political groups are perceived as very powerful 
inside the EP (Finke, 2014). Through their analysis, we seek to address three 
problems. First, are there differences among political groups in how they use the 
questions as a tool? That means, are there differences between political groups 
supporting the Commission and those opposing it? Second, because there are 
several types2 of parliamentary questions in the EP, we aim to reveal whether 
they are used differently and what these potential differences tell us. Third, 
we are interested to know whether medium-term trends can be ascertained in 
the use of parliamentary questions. To answer these questions, we analyse the 
dataset we have put together, consisting of all parliamentary questions posed 
during the terms 2004–2009 and 2009–2014.3
Our main finding is that opposition and “governmental” roles can be discerned in 
the EP in connection with the parliamentary questions that have been posed, but 
much depends on how these questions are analysed. At the aggregated level—i.e. 
when all questions are included—political groups differ in their asking of these 
questions, depending on whether they belong to the so-called “grand coalition” 
that is represented in the Commission, or whether they can be considered part of 
the opposition camp. However, descending to the analytical level of individual 
types of questions, this finding is no longer true. First, as far as oral questions are 
concerned, the behaviour of both camps changed between the terms 2004–2009 
2 Individual MEPs cannot use all types of questions—only some, as set out in the Rules 
of Procedure of the EP.
3 There are two reasons to choose this term. First, it is the last completed term preced-
ing the current one. Second, it is a term subsequent to the great EU enlargement that 
admitted Central and Eastern European countries.
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and 2009–2014. Whereas in the former term the opposition was more active, in 
the latter the groups represented in the Commission posed more questions. For 
questions posed during Question Time, no difference could be found between 
opposition and “government” groups in either term. It is in written questions, 
then, that a difference between opposition and pro-European Commission 
groups can be identified. Written questions evidently provide the bulk of the 
total number of questions posed in the EP and their number has increased over 
time; these facts testify to their importance. Our analysis contributes to research 
about how MEPs and political groups act. Although largely exploratory and 
leading to further questions rather than providing strong explanations, the paper 
helps us to understand whether and how a classic form of competition between 
government and opposition is emerging in the EP.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section presents the state of the art as 
far as opposition in the EP is concerned. The following section describes the 
data and classifies the political groups active in the EP during the two terms 
examined, presenting also our method. The next section consists of the analysis 
and provides answers to our questions. In the concluding section, we discuss 
our findings with existing knowledge and suggest avenues for further research.
2. opposition in the European parliament:  
A	specific	kind	of	power?
Since there is no special theory4 that would define and explain the workings of 
opposition in the EP, we proceed from the theory of opposition5 that has been 
primarily devised for parliamentary democracies. According to this theory, the 
opposition should scrutinise and criticise the government, but also articulate and 
aggregate interests, and seek to gain a share of power. Parliamentary questions, 
the subject of this article, fall into the category of scrutiny.
The opposition in the EP does not work in the same way as in national parliaments. 
There is no clearly defined relationship between the executive and the legislative 
4 We do not mean theories explaining European integration as such. 
5 Various attempts have been made in political science to provide a definition of oppo-
sition that would be universally valid (Kubát, 2010, p. 17). A classic example is that 
of Dahl, who described opposition on the basis of the alternation of groups in power. 
A group governing at any given point might later become opposition, and opposition, 
by contrast, might come to power. Democracy is secured when the opposition is able 
to take power, but only on the basis of democratic elections. Unlike most others, 
Dahl’s definition can be applied to any political system (Dahl, 1966, pp. 336–339). 
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branches as exists in parliamentary democracies (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 
2011, p. 122). Our basic premise is that opposition can be identified in the EP 
and that it constitutes a specific kind of power. In literature, there are two basic 
views of opposition in the EP. The first sees it as opposition to the EU, and the 
second as opposition to the Commission.
The most comprehensive analysis of opposition in the EP to date has been 
provided by Helms (2008), who studied opposition in both nation states and 
the EU. Helms concluded that opposition in the EP can be studied, but that the 
activities of opposition MEPs are largely informed by the national level. Helms 
argues that, despite the options available to opposition, there is no government 
(European Commission) alternation, as Dahl (1966) and others would expect to 
take place. According to Helms, the opposition in the EP is weak, and it does 
not fulfil the functions it might exercise. Helms explains the workings of the 
EU by a multi-level model of checks and balances, involving a large number of 
various actors. Greater politicisation of EU institutions, Helms argues, would 
solve the problem, allowing for a more efficient functioning of government and 
opposition alike (Helms, 2008, pp. 212–235).
Navarro (2010) not only analysed opposition in the EP in general, but also 
tangentially touched upon parliamentary questions which, he argues, can be 
used by opposition MEPs to attack government and obtain information. Navarro 
considers the Commission a government, consisting of a grand coalition, 
supported sometimes by other parliamentary factions such as the Greens. He 
considers the remaining parties as the opposition, i.e. he defines opposition via 
the sharing of power (Navarro, 2010, pp. 15–16). Brack (2012) offers another 
view, defining the opposition on the basis of parties’ approaches towards the 
European integration, and describing the hard Eurosceptics as the opposition. 
According to Brack, party Euroscepticism and opposition in the EP are 
interconnected (Brack, 2012, pp. 51–67). Both positions are brought together 
by Leconte, suggesting that Eurosceptics have little influence over the formation 
of the college of commissioners, which means that they have virtually no power 
in the Commission (Leconte, 2010, p. 15). 
The concept of opposition plays a significant role in research on parliamentary 
questions in the EP. There are three reasons why MEPs submit questions: to 
gain information, to scrutinise or to obstruct. Having studied parliamentary 
democracies, Wiberg (1994) presented a range of motivations that might lead 
to a question being posed. Members of national parliaments (rather than MEPs 
specifically) might ask to obtain information, support a certain activity, gain 
personal publicity, ask for an explanation of some activity, attack ministers 
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in a complicated political situation, present various interests, build their 
own reputation on certain specific questions, push the government towards 
compromise, delay a government decision, point out mistakes, gather opposition 
forces to attack the government or render the situation more dramatic (Wiberg, 
1994, pp. 30–31). This catalogue, however, is primarily linked with parliamentary 
democracies, precluding its application to MEPs. Navarro (2010), analysing why 
MEPs pose questions, highlighted their attempts to be re-elected. He argues that 
politicians ask questions in order to get re-elected, obtain a leadership position 
or influence policy. There are also situations when MEPs themselves are not 
particularly invested in the questions, but act as proxies for interest groups, 
lobbyists, civil servants of their nation state or their constituents. There might 
even be a situation in which Commission officials prepare the question, which 
the MEP then submits to the Commission, allowing it to defend its position 
(Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, pp. 219–221). 
Each type of question presented above can be variously motivated. These are 
primarily dependent on the case, for which a particular type of question might 
be suitable or not, and on the type of information. Should MEPs wish to pose a 
question, they must consider which type is the most suitable for their particular 
situation. Addressing the following four points might help them to do so: (1) 
Is the question urgent or not? (2) Is it important which specific person should 
answer the question? (3) Is further discussion required? (4) Do the inquirers 
wish to influence other actors? (Sánchez de Dios & Wiberg, 2011, p. 356).6 The 
answers should suggest which type of question is the most suitable. A choice 
of the correct type of question is the first step towards satisfying the inquirer.
The varying motivations for and effects of posing a question play an important 
role in choosing the type of question. Papers studying the use of parliamentary 
questions most often analyse their individual types and confirm that there are 
differences in how they are used (Westlake, 1994; Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 
2011; Raunio, 1996; Meijer, 2001; Judge & Earnshaw, 2008; Sánchez de Dios & 
Wiberg, 2011; Jensen, Proksch & Slapin, 2013; Navarro, 2010; Russo & Wiberg, 
2010; Sozzi, 2016). Typically, there is a difference between oral and written 
questions. The former is particularly suitable when the issue under question is 
broad and the involvement of a wide spectrum of actors is desired, since the 
purpose of these questions is to address a wider audience and to express a general 
position. Written questions are usually addressed to a more specific audience 
and are more specialised (Rozenberg & Martin, 2011). By contrast, Question 
6 A selection of some questions as proposed by Sánchez de Dios and Wiberg. We have 
selected questions that might be relevant for MEPs (Sánchez de Dios & Wiberg, 
2011, p. 356).
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Time can be efficiently used by MEPs to inform their colleagues about a topic 
on which they are focused, or if they want to attract attention to themselves.
Table 1. Choosing the type of question
Urgency Who answers Further 
discussion
Influence on 
other actors
For oral 
answer  
(type O)
Yes Committee member May take 
place
Public 
discussion 
possible
For written 
answer (types  
P and E)
No Questions 
addressed to 
specific individuals
No Published 
officially, 
potential future 
impact
At question 
time  
(type H)
Yes Selected European 
Commission 
representatives only
May take 
place
Possible 
involvement of 
other MEPs
Source: Authors (modified from Sánchez de Dios & Wiberg, 2011)
We assume that the different manner in which questions are used will also 
be manifested in the relationship between the opposition and government. 
Our argument is supported by the work of Brack (2012; 2015). Though not 
primarily focused on parliamentary questions, her analysis of hard Eurosceptic 
groups touches upon the issue. Brack proceeded from Hirschman’s (1970) work 
and devised four ideal types describing the roles in which Eurosceptics might 
act in the EP. These are: the absentee (exit strategy); the pragmatist, who is 
involved in the EP and actively uses their right to vote (voice strategy);7 the 
public orator, whose aim is to achieve public exposure and, potentially, to spread 
negative views on the EU, and the participant, who seeks consensus, influence 
in committees, and also makes use of informal procedures. According to Brack’s 
findings, public orators make more use of the option to ask questions and to talk 
at plenary sessions (Brack, 2012). 
Sozzi (2016) studied how MEPs use parliamentary questions, focussing on 
several variables that might influence questioning. Sozzi studied both the 
national and supranational aspects of the issue and examined the effects of 
7 Brack argues that hard Eurosceptics do not participate in the work of the EP and do 
not use the options at their disposal. However, an interview-based study has shown 
that Eurosceptic MEPs do use parliamentary questions for written answers, by means 
of which they defend the interests of their constituents. Pragmatically-minded Euro-
sceptics employ a range of instruments made available to them by the EP.
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electoral systems, as well as of the environment from which MEPs originate. 
Sozzi noted that British MEPs make more use of parliamentary questions, due 
to the substantial tradition of the device in their country. He sees questions 
as a tool that MEPs may use to improve their reputation and build up their 
political image. The results of Sozzi’s analysis, based on data from the sixth 
electoral term, partially support Raunio’s (1996) assumption that smaller and 
less relevant groups use questions more often. This was proven for the leftist 
group GUE. However, Sozzi does not analyse all questions, limiting himself 
to two types, written and oral. Furthermore, he also included questions to the 
Council in his study. 
To sum up, existing research suggests that there is no agreement on how the 
opposition in the EP should be defined and how it uses its power. That is 
particularly visible when it comes to the parliamentary questions. Up-to-date 
work is in this regard rather fractured and often addresses only fragments of 
the oppositional behaviour in non-systematic way. Our aim is to fill this gap 
by a comprehensive analysis of two EP’s terms. Two disclaimers have to be 
stated here. First, we assume that the Commission can be conceptualised as 
part-executive (the European government); however, we are aware of that the 
European Council also exercises executive powers to some extent.8 Division of 
executive powers between these two institutions, however, is not symmetric as 
the European Council is not active in day-to-day politics and does not shape the 
same amount of EU policies as the Commission does. Second, we are aware that 
our article analyses only a certain segment of the powers given to the opposition. 
We are aware of that opposition may use various instruments (votes, budgetary 
procedure, election of the Commission) at the disposal of different actors within 
the EP. We analyse a part of them, which means that the article does not provide a 
comprehensive study of how the opposition works in the EP and rather analyses 
some of its activities, suggesting how this opposition is to be understood.
8 The Commission is the principal executive body of the EU. Despite, the European 
Council has executive powers to some extent. The European Council is composed of 
national leaders, it gathers the executive power of the Member States and, thus, has 
influence on high-profile policy. The European Council decides on the EU’s over-
all direction and political priorities. Setting the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy is important for the European Council. The European Council nominates and 
appoints candidates to certain high-profile EU level roles (such as the ECB). 
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3. data and methods
MEPs pose parliamentary questions to the Commission and the Council of the 
EU. Via these questions, MEPs, committees and political groups in the EP can 
scrutinise the Commission and the Council, obtain information, and highlight 
issues both at the EU and national levels. Parliamentary questions can also be 
used as a specific form of obstruction (Jensen, Proksch & Slapin, 2013). They 
provide opposition MEPs with a suitable instrument with which to scrutinise 
the Commission.
Each calendar year, the EP poses some 7,000–11,000 questions to the 
Commission and the number has increased every year. However, this growth 
does not apply to every type of question, as will be shown below. Parliamentary 
questions have been linked with the institutional framework of the EU for a 
long time. The MEP’s right to ask, and the Commission’s obligation to answer, 
was established as far back as the ECSC Treaty, Article 23 of which stipulated 
that the High Authority shall reply to all oral or written questions posed by the 
Assembly or its members, and the procedure has not changed much since then.
Figure 1. Total number of questions from 1999 to 2014
Source: Authors (European Parliament, 2014)
Figure 1 shows that the number of questions asked has increased and between the 
sixth (2004–2009) and seventh (2009–2014) electoral terms the number grew by 
nearly 24,000. For illustration, we also provide data for 1999–2004.9 The growth 
in the number of questions can be explained by the increase in the number of 
9 It is worth noting that in 1999–2004 the EP was a smaller body, with 626 MEPs.
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MEPs, and by extra powers being given to the EP, which strengthened that body’s 
position. Navarro claims, however, that there is no single factor explaining the 
gradual increase in the number of questions posed; rather, multiple factors are 
involved (Navarro, 2010).
There are three basic types of questions and their rules are set by the Rules 
of Procedure of the EP. The first comprises questions to be answered orally 
with debate (Oral questions/Question for oral answer—type O). They may be 
followed by a resolution. Such questions can be posed by 40 or more MEPs, by 
a committee or by a political group (Article 128 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the EP). MEPs use these questions when they wish to discuss draft legislation 
of the EC, fundamental EU issues or questions of international interest. Type O 
questions are asked when the issue under scrutiny demands the involvement of a 
greater number of participants and a broader discussion than questions answered 
in writing (Švecová, 2010, pp. 30–31). The fact that oral questions demand the 
involvement of a greater number of MEPs can be seen as a disadvantage, as it 
precludes individual MEPs from asking such questions on their own. 
The second type are questions requiring a written answer (Written questions/
Question for written answer), with two sub-types, priority (P) and non-priority 
(E) questions. Defined in Article 130 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure, written 
questions are among those most often asked. An MEP may submit a maximum 
of five such questions per month. Non-priority questions should be answered 
within six weeks, but that limit is often exceeded. If MEPs wish to receive a 
quick answer, and this does not require detailed research, they may submit a 
priority question, which should be answered in three weeks. One such question 
is allowed per MEP per month. In his study, Raunio emphasises the advantage 
of written questions for those MEPs who wish to avoid direct interaction, as 
submitting questions in writing allows them to avoid speaking out. He also 
notes that many questions are posed repeatedly, which may indicate either an 
attempt to show that the matter is urgent, or to highlight that there has not been 
an acceptable change or shift in the agenda. According to Raunio, there are 
two basic reasons for submitting questions that require written responses: to 
scrutinise the Commission and to obtain information (Raunio 1996, pp. 361–
364). A significant advantage of questions demanding written answers is that 
MEPs receive an official statement from the Commission, which is publicly 
accessible and can be referred to in the future. Written questions are used 
to gain information about sensitive issues, and where more detailed work is 
needed to prepare the answer. They are also used when EU law has been 
contravened, and if MEPs demand detailed technical information (Švecová, 
2010, p. 27).The third type of questions is comprised of those asked during 
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Question Time (Question for Question Time—type H). One or more topics, 
which are set by the Conference of Presidents a month ahead, may be discussed 
during Question Time.10 Two or three commissioners, whose portfolios relate 
to the given horizontal topic (Article 129 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure), 
answer the questions. The motive for asking questions during Question Time 
is not so much to gain information as to scrutinise the Commission or to 
spark debate. The procedure, held at the Strasbourg sessions, is among the 
most controversial and least understood. Obvious disadvantages include the 
limited scope of topics that can be queried: one cannot ask for specific or 
statistical data, etc. The limited number of commissioners means that selected 
commissioners speak for the whole Commission, often on topics that are 
not directly part of their portfolios (Raunio, 1996, p. 359). Although these 
questions have long been part of EU primary law, and are used often, they 
have not been given sufficient attention, remaining on the margins of interest 
of EP studies.
EP political groups represent the second “kind” of data we are analysing. We 
have analysed their behaviour in the two most recent electoral terms. In the 
sixth term (2004–2009) there were seven groups in the EP, alongside a group 
of non-attached MEPs. As indicated above, we consider those political groups 
which do not have influence in the Commission to be opposition. During the 
sixth term these included GUE/NGL, IND&DEM, G-EFA and UEN, because 
in addition to independent commissioners, there were also those affiliated 
with EPP-ED, PES and ALDE. In the next term, the political make-up of the 
Commission did not change. EPP, SD and ALDE had their representatives in 
the Commission. Thus, for the 2009–2014, term we consider the following 
groups to constitute the opposition: ECR, GUE/NGL, G-EFA and EFD 
(Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011; Bressanelli, 2012; Akbaba, 2014, Finke, 
2015). Although non-attached MEPs often belong to the opposition (extreme 
right-wing parties, for instance) we have excluded non-attached MEPs from 
our analysis as they do not constitute an organised group of MEPs in the strict 
10 Question Time with the Commission may be held at each part-session for a duration 
of up to 90 minutes on one or more specific horizontal themes to be decided upon by 
the Conference of Presidents one month in advance of the part-session. The Member 
shall be given one minute in which to formulate the question and the Commissioner 
two minutes in which to reply. That Member may put a supplementary question, 
lasting no longer than 30 seconds and having a direct bearing on the main question. 
The Commissioner shall then be given two minutes in which to give a supplementary 
reply. Rule 129 states: “Question time shall not be specifically allocated in advance. 
The President shall, as far as possible, ensure that Members that hold different politi-
cal views and that come from different Member States are given the opportunity to 
put a question in turn.” (Rule of Procedure of the European Parliament 129).
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sense of the word.11 We are, of course, aware that there are other possibilities 
which could be used as a cutting point. For example, voting in motion of (no) 
confidence could be such a case, or position of a particular national party—
member of an EP political group—within its domestic political system. 
However, both these choices are not without major problems. When it comes 
to the former, negative voting (or abstention) in confidence vote12 could 
be just a symbolic act which does not exclude future intensive support for 
policy proposals. The latter perspective is even more problematic. Though the 
Commission is partly appointed by the national governments via the European 
Council—and one could thus expect that candidates supported by the national 
governments are nominated—its policy arena is a European level, not the 
national. Therefore, we believe that our decision to link opposition in the EP 
with non-representation in the Commission is the least bad choice. 
The analytical section of the article first presents the structure of parliamentary 
questions, which we subsequently analyse with the aim of ascertaining what 
differences there might be between political groups. Our original intention 
was to use the analysis of variance (ANOVA), ascertaining thereby whether 
some groups pose questions more frequently than others, to a degree that is 
statistically significant. In other words, we wished to find out using ANOVA 
whether political groups could be divided into two coherent clusters, the 
opposition and the government, as expected from their relationship towards 
the Commission. ANOVA proved impossible to use, however, as it expects the 
groups being compared to be roughly of the same size, and the values achieved 
by the individual units within them to show no great variance. The descriptive 
overviews of data for the two terms, provided in Tables 2 and 3, demonstrate 
that neither assumption was true, as also confirmed by Levene’s test carried out 
in both cases. Its values of high statistical significance show that the groups 
are not numerically comparable, and that there is no normal distribution of 
parliamentary questions among their members.
11 Moreover, oral questions may be tabled by a political group, a committee or at least 
5 per cent of Parliament’s component Members (38) (Rule of Procedure of the Euro-
pean Parliament 128). Not only for technical and statistical reasons we have excluded 
non-attached MEPs.  
12 Even if we used voting in confidence vote for both terms, we would stick to the 
same divisions. For the 2004–2009 term, the Commission was backed up by EPP 
(239 for, 1 against, 19 abstentions), PES (123-29-31), ALDE (59-0-0), UEN (16-1-7). 
Remaining groups voted in majority against the Commission: G-EFA (0-40-0), IND/
DEM (0-28-3), GUE/NGL (0-34-0), NI (12-16-1). For the 2009–2014 Commission, 
supportive majority consisted of EPP (243-2-2), S&D (164-13-1), ALDE (74-6-0), 
whereas the opposition were represented by ECR (0-1-50), GUE/NGL (2-31-2), EFD 
(0-14-15), NI (3-21-2), G-EFA (2-51-2). 
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Table 2. Numerical strength and distribution of values within groups, 2004–2009
Group N Minimum Maximum
NI (Non-Inscrits) 33 0 853
PES (Party of European Socialists) 216 0 1,071
EPP-ED (European People’s Party and 
European Democrats)
292 0 353
G-EFA (The Greens and European Free 
Alliance)
43 3 414
UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations) 31 3 703
GUE/NGL (European United Left and 
Nordic Green Left)
41 1 980
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe)
100 0 461
IND/DEM (Independence and Democracy) 36 0 2,015
Total 792 0 2,015
Levene: 11.89 (p < 0.01)
Source: Authors
Table 3. Numerical strength and distribution of values within groups, 2009–2014
Group N Minimum Maximum
NI (Non-Inscrits) 29 0 671
S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats)
196 0 1,229
EPP (European People’s Party) 276 0 1,493
G-EFA (The Greens and European Free 
Alliance)
57 6 954
ECR (European Conservatives and 
Reformists)
57 2 728
GUE/NGL (European United Left and 
Nordic Green Left)
36 2 910
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe)
86 1 1,018
EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) 28 5 1,389
Total 765 0 1,493
Levene: 9.56 (p < 0.01)
Source: Authors
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The nature of the data logically suggested non-parametric testing. We have 
opted for the Kruskal-Wallis test, which includes a post-hoc Mann-Whitney 
test (Field, 2009, pp. 559–568). The problem with the Kruskal-Wallis test is 
that it can tell us whether there are differences between the groups but is unable 
to distinguish between which groups there is a difference and how large it is. 
Given the need to compare groups with each other, the use of a post-hoc test 
is not suitable: due to the number of groups (and the related number of tests 
needed), we would put the analysis at risk of type II error, because when using 
the Bonferroni correction we could not consider any coefficients with p < 0.01 
to be statistically significant.13
Given that we expected the government and opposition groups to behave 
differently, we have recoded political groups into a binary variable, expressing 
belonging to the opposition or the Commission majority, respectively. We 
have analysed our data using a series of Mann-Whitney tests, which provide a 
non-parametric alternative to t tests. Having recoded political groups into the 
new variable, there nevertheless remained a non-normal distribution of data, 
precluding parametric tests; hence our series of Mann-Whitney tests. Since our 
aims included, among other things, a comparison of consistency of opposition 
behaviour in the two electoral terms, our analysis proceeds according to the type 
of question, and not according to parliamentary terms. 
4. analysis
As noted in Section 2 above, there are three types of parliamentary questions, 
of which we provide an overview in Table 4. A comparison of the two EP terms 
analysed reveals that in the 2009–2014 term the number of questions increased 
by 76 per cent compared with the previous term. The bulk of this increase is 
accounted for by questions for written answer. In the second term their number 
almost doubled (an increase of 93 per cent). It is also evident that questions 
demanding a written answer are the dominant type of question. In 2004–2009, 
they accounted for 89 per cent of all questions; in 2009–2014 their share was 
even higher at 97 per cent of the total.
13 The Bonferroni correction divides the traditional level of statistical significance 
p < 0.05 by the number of tests carried out. If three groups are compared, the value is 
p < 0.02 (0.05/3); when ten tests are performed, this value decreases to p < 0.005, thus 
excluding results that would otherwise be considered of high statistical significance.
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Table 4. Total number of questions
2004–2009 2009–2014
Oral questions 399 787
Written questions 27,648 53,262
 • priority 4,161 4,037
 • non-priority 23,487 49,225
Question Time 3,089 715
Total 31,136 54,764
Source: Authors
The data above clearly indicate that the share of questions for written answer 
(non-priority ones) is so large that one may deduce that the groups’ behaviour 
with respect to these questions will influence the results of the analysis for the 
whole population of parliamentary questions. This needs to be borne in mind 
whilst interpreting.
Our first analysis focused on the total number of questions. Beyond the 
coefficients of the Mann-Whitney U test and its significance we also provide 
effect size. We report median values rather than averages, as the median is a 
more precise indication for non-parametric tests than the average (Field, 2009, 
p. 550). During the sixth term (2004–2009), the opposition (Mdn = 25) posed 
statistically highly significantly more questions than the groups which made up 
the majority of the Commission (Mdn = 15), U = 44,776.00, z = -4.11. Effect 
size (r = -0.14) was small. In the seventh term (2009–2014), the opposition 
(Mdn = 54) again posed highly significantly more questions than the groups that 
made the majority in the Commission (Mdn = 37), U = 49,667.00, z = -2.98. 
Effect size (r = -0.11) was again small. Thus, we note that at the most aggregate 
level there were very significant differences between the opposition and the 
majority in the Commission during both terms.
In the next step we analysed the various types of questions, including the two 
sub-types of written questions. We report the same data as in the first test: the 
coefficients of the Mann-Whitney U test, coefficient z, the median and the effect 
size.
The analysis of the first type of question (to be answered orally) led to an 
interesting finding, which corrects the conclusion of the analysis of all questions. 
Whereas in the sixth term (2004–2009), the opposition (Mdn = 4) posed 
statistically highly significantly more questions than the groups that made up 
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the majority in the Commission (Mdn = 2), U = 45,263.00, z = -3.96, the effect 
size (r = -0.14) was small, in the seventh term the situation changed. The groups 
which in 2009–2014 made up the majority in the Commission (Mdn = 6) posed 
highly significantly more questions than the groups that were in opposition 
(Mdn = 4), U = 48,880.00, z = -0.28. Effect size (r = -0.12) was small, as it had 
been during the sixth term. 
When questions posed during Question Time were considered, no difference 
was found between the majority in the Commission and the opposition groups 
in either electoral term. During the sixth term (2004–2009), the opposition (Mdn 
= 1) asked more questions than the groups that made up the majority in the 
Commission (Mdn = 0), U = 54,351.00, z = -0.62. The Mann-Whitney U test, 
however, was not statistically significant (p = 0.26). Despite the Mann-Whitney U 
test, the assumption that the opposition would be the more active was confirmed. 
It remained so during the seventh term. The Mann-Whitney U test was again 
not statistically significant (p = 0.19), showing values of U = 55,948.50 and z = 
-0.91. That the activities of the two groups were comparable is also shown by 
the median values for the opposition (Mdn = 0) and “government” (Mdn = 0).
The last set of tests undertaken was concerned with questions for written answer, 
where we differentiated between priority and non-priority questions. Among the 
former group (priority) the analysis showed the same results in both terms. In 
the sixth term (2004–2009) the opposition (Mdn = 3) posed statistically highly 
significantly more questions than the groups which made up the majority of the 
Commission (Mdn = 2), U = 49,234.00, z = -2.50. Effect size (r = -0.09) was 
small. In the seventh term, the opposition (Mdn = 4) again posed statistically 
highly significantly more questions than the groups which made up the majority 
of the Commission (Mdn = 3), U = 46,110.50, z = -4.33. Effect size (r = -0.16) 
was small.
Analysis of non-priority questions produced very similar results. In the sixth 
term (2004-2009) the opposition (Mdn = 10.50) posed statistically highly 
significantly more questions than the groups which made up the majority of 
the Commission (Mdn = 7), U = 50,182.50, z = -2.09. Effect size (r = -0.07) 
was small. In the seventh term, opposition (Mdn = 34) again posed statistically 
highly significantly more questions than the groups which made up the majority 
of the Commission (Mdn = 24), U = 49,796, z = -2.93. The size of the effect (r 
= -0.16) increased, yet remained small.
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Table 5. Summary of analysis results
Total Written 
answer – 
Priority
Written 
answer 
– Non-
priority 
Question 
Time
Oral 
answer
2004–2009 Opposition + + + / +
Commission - - - / -
2009–2014 Opposition + + + / -
Commission - - - / +
Source: Authors
Summing up the results of our tests, we note that the opposition asked more 
questions in both terms (Table 5). At the aggregate level, the picture is crystal 
clear and this has been a medium-term trend. In a more nuanced perspective, 
which considers the fact that there are various types of parliamentary questions 
and that they may serve a variety of purposes, the conclusion is not simple. For 
two types of questions where one would expect the greatest difference—i.e. 
questions for oral answers and those posed during Question Time—there was 
either no discernible trend (i.e. the opposition/Commission groups changed 
their behaviour after 2009) or no difference. This could mean two things. One 
interpretation would suggest that the opposition changed between 2004–2009 
and 2009–2014 and became less active. The second one could mean that the 
political groups supporting the Commission strategically asked more questions 
in the later period in order to balance the activity of opposition. 
The expected differences are observable in the medium term in questions for 
written answers. However, these questions are less visible to the electorate, and 
less useful for gaining media exposure or for political competition, than oral 
questions or those asked during Question Time. On the other hand, MEPs can 
use information obtained via them for other purposes, for example in domestic 
competition. 
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5. conclusion
In a nutshell, the aim of our analysis was to ascertain whether a government–
opposition relationship could be explained by the use of parliamentary questions 
in the EP. We were also interested to know whether the political groups behaved 
consistently across the various types of parliamentary questions. Finally, we 
wished to ascertain whether there were medium-term trends in the groups’ 
behaviour. We sought answers to these questions via an analysis of the datasets 
we have created, covering the parliamentary terms 2004–2009 and 2009–2014. 
Our analysis was conceived as exploratory rather than explanatory.
Answers to our questions depend on the scope of the data taken into consideration. 
At the aggregate level including all questions, the difference between opposition 
groups and those standing behind the Commission is statistically convincing. 
However, this is just a first sentence in the conclusion which provides additional 
questions rather than answers. First, knowing that aggregate level is heavily 
Figure 2. Boxplot detailing the use of parliamentary questions by MEPs, 2004–2009
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influenced by the amount of written questions—representing a very specific type 
of questions which are not addressed to the general public—raises a thought what 
difference at aggregate level tells us about the relation between opposition and 
groups represented in the Commission. Such doubts are even strengthened when 
examining the individual types of parliamentary questions, particularly those 
that are considered as the most important ones for parliamentary opposition. 
Here, no strong conclusion can be made, since the behaviour of the two camps 
changes over time and depends on the type of question. Quite surprisingly, 
particularly as far as the types of questions where opposition should be more 
active are concerned, its activity is smaller than in case of written questions. We 
suggest to understand this “deviance” as a consequence of EU level electoral 
and political system. MEPs in all Member States are still elected within their 
domestic constituencies whereas their activities—including questions asked by 
the opposition—address the EU level. Its visibility as well as attractiveness for 
the voters, however, is questionable. The distance—not only in geographical, 
but also in social terms—between “Brussels” and constituencies is remarkable, 
limiting the effect of particular tools which the opposition has at its disposal. 
Figure 3. Boxplot detailing the use of parliamentary questions by MEPs, 2009–2014
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In this context, a broader use of written questions may make more sense for the 
opposition as they can provide knowledge that can be used further on. 
It seems, therefore, that a better understanding of parliamentary questions in 
the EP would be facilitated by further analyses. Here we see two promising 
directions. The first one should target at the micro-level, i.e. one that considered 
individual MEPs as analytical units. The two boxplots we have created to outline 
homogeneity/heterogeneity within the two camps over the two terms suggest as 
much.
The two boxplots show that there were considerable differences between 
the MEPs of the two camps, and of the various groups, as evidenced by the 
substantial number of outliers in both the coalition and the opposition camps. 
This can be explained by the existence of particular MEPs who are within their 
groups responsible for posing questions. Even though this does not mean that 
other MEPs would be passive and do not ask questions at all, it suggests that 
variations among individual MEPs might be more interesting, and more telling, 
than variations among whole groups. 
The need for micro-level research perspective is supported by another argument. 
Although our analysis was not explanatory by design, we believe that much of 
the turbulence in the relationship between opposition and coalition in the EP 
might be due to the MEPs’ complicated position. They face more principals 
than just their political group in the EP. They divide their loyalty between this 
group (if they are members of one at all) and their national party or nation state, 
i.e. they are in the position of an agent with at least two principals. All these 
factors may affect an MEP’s behaviour and these factors do not always act 
synergistically. In other words, the manner in which MEPs use parliamentary 
questions may well be influenced by variables outside the EP. 
Furthermore, our analysis focused on the number of questions asked as the 
indicator leaving aside their content. In-depth research on topics covered by the 
questions could shed much light on the general role that questions play in the 
Parliament’s political life. As we have found that political groups differ in their 
activities in numeric terms, we would expect the same difference to be found 
also in terms of the “quality” of questions asked. Detailed analysis of the content 
could shed more light on the purpose of why particular MEPs use a particular 
type of question and how they work with answers they get in their other political 
activities. 
Apart from the two abovementioned suggested directions for further research we 
believe that future research should focus on the more nuanced conceptualisation 
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of opposition in the EP. We are aware that there are more types of cleavages 
and the opposition–Commission division, on which our analysis is based, could 
be schematic. Therefore, another interesting avenue of future work could be 
an analysis of groups’ behaviour within the notional clusters of opposition/
coalition in the Commission. For the opposition groups in particular, multiple 
perspectives could be adopted, of which the first could focus on their different 
positions on European integration, especially in terms of their varying types of 
party-based Euroscepticism. There are also differences among these groups in 
terms of their placement on the left-to-right spectrum, and the length of their 
tenure in the Parliament. Future research could also focus on another potentially 
useful parameter—the electoral system and national differences and traditions 
in relation to parliamentary questions. A preferential vote could imply the need 
to be better recognised by voters and citizens could be an important incentive 
to parliamentary questions. On the other hand, a special role of the MEP—
“questioner”—could exist in the EP.
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